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Abstract
Using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, we examine the causal impact of the Affordable Care Act
on health-related outcomes after 3 years. We estimate difference-in-difference-in-differences models that exploit variation
in treatment intensity from 2 sources: (1) local area prereform uninsured rates from 2013 and (2) state participation in the
Medicaid expansion. Including the third postreform year leads to 2 important insights. First, gains in health insurance coverage
and access to care from the policy continued to increase in the third year. Second, an improvement in the probability of
reporting excellent health emerged in the third year, with the effect being largely driven by the non-Medicaid expansions
components of the policy.
Keywords
Affordable Care Act, health insurance, access to care, health care access, self-assessed health, self-reported health, health
What do we already know about this topic?
While the Affordable Care Act (ACA) increased insurance coverage and access to care after 1 (2014) or 2 (2014-2015)
postreform years, the existing causally interpretable evidence suggests that effects on self-assessed health outcomes
were not as clear after 2 years.
How does your research contribute to the field?
The purpose of this article is to revisit the causal impact of the ACA on health insurance coverage, access to care, and
self-assessed health using newly released calendar year 2016 data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System.
What are your research’s implications toward theory, practice, or policy?
We find that gains in health insurance coverage and access to care from the policy continued to increase, while an
improvement in the probability of reporting excellent health emerged in the third year, with the effect being largely
driven by the non-Medicaid expansions components of the policy.

Introduction
The primary components of the Affordable Care Act (ACA),
including the individual mandate, subsidized Marketplace
coverage, and state Medicaid expansions, were implemented
in 2014.1 A growing literature has emerged evaluating how
state-specific insurance coverage,2-10 access to care,11-13 and
self-assessed health14-19 changed following the law’s implementation. Studies aiming to identify causal effects of the
ACA using nationwide data tend to find that it increased
insurance coverage and access to care after 1 (2014) or 2
(2014-2015) postreform years, but did not have as clear an
effect on self-assessed health.15-18 These findings are perhaps
surprising given that other recent coverage expansions have
translated into gains in self-assessed health over a relatively

short time period, including the 2006 Massachusetts health
care reform20,21 and the 2008 Oregon Medicaid lottery.22,23
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The purpose of this article is to revisit the causal effects of
the ACA on health insurance coverage, access to care, and
self-assessed health using newly released calendar year 2016
data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
(BRFSS). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first article
to examine causal impacts on these outcomes using a national
sample and 3 years of postreform data (2014-2016). There are
multiple reasons why the addition of a third year is important.
First, it may take time for the newly insured to get acclimated
with their new coverage and how to use it effectively. The
duration of this adjustment period could be impacted by factors on the demand-side of the market, as one article suggests
that only 12% of adults have proficient health literacy,24 or
factors on the supply-side, such as the issues associated with
the rollout of the Marketplace.25 Second, economists generally
model health as a capital stock that changes gradually in
response to changes in health-related investments.26 Even if
changes in health care utilization occurred quickly, several
years may pass before the resulting health gains become sufficiently large to be statistically detectable. Rapid improvements in self-assessed health reported in other contexts could
plausibly be the result of a “warm glow” associated with gaining public or subsidized private coverage rather than genuine
improvements in health.21,22 In other words, some individuals
may report better health simply because of an overall feeling
of happiness from receiving a valuable product. Such a “warm
glow” may not have occurred with the ACA because of its low
popularity (36% of adults making under $40 000 reported
viewing the ACA favorably in January 2014) relative to the
Massachusetts and Oregon expansions.27
Following recent articles seeking to estimate the impact
of the full ACA, we estimate difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) models with the differences coming from
time, state Medicaid expansion status, and local area pretreatment uninsured rate.7,18,28 Studies that focus only on the
ACA’s Medicaid expansion typically use a simpler difference-in-differences (DD) model that compares changes in
Medicaid expansion states to changes in nonexpansion
states. However, identifying the impact of the other components of the ACA, such as the individual mandate and subsidized Marketplace coverage, is more challenging because
they were implemented in every state simultaneously. Our
third difference addresses this challenge by exploiting the
fact that the national components of the ACA should provide
the most intense “treatment” in areas with the highest prereform uninsured rates. This is in the spirit of studies evaluating the introduction of Medicare and the Massachusetts
health insurance reform.29,30
Our data set consists of nonelderly adults included in the
2011-2016 waves of the BRFSS. The BRFSS is a commonly
used data source in the ACA literature because it includes a
number of questions related to health care access and selfassessed health. In addition, it is large enough to precisely
estimate the effects of state policy interventions, with over
300 000 observations per year.

INQUIRY
We find that the ACA substantially improved access to
care among nonelderly adults. Relative to 2013, insurance
coverage in Medicaid expansion states increased by 6.5 percentage points in 2014, 9.7 percentage points in 2015, and
11.8 percentage points in 2016. In states that did not expand
Medicaid, gains in insurance coverage were 3.6 percentage
points in 2014, 5.9 percentage points in 2015, and 8.3 percentage points in 2016. We also find that the ACA reduced
reports of costs being a barrier to seeking care and increased
the likelihood of having a primary care doctor, with the
effects again growing over time. The gains in these outcomes
are only modestly larger in Medicaid expansion states than in
nonexpansion states, implying that they are mostly attributable to the nationwide components of the ACA.
With respect to self-assessed health, we find that the ACA
increased the probability of reporting excellent health and
reduced days in poor mental health. In contrast, a recent article with only 2 posttreatment years found no evidence of
gains in these outcomes despite also using BRFSS data and
the same identification strategy.18 The emergence of an impact
on the probability of having excellent self-assessed health
appears particularly gradual, as the effect of the full ACA was
small and insignificant in 2014, 1.9 percentage points in 2015,
and 2.7 percentage points in 2016. Improvements in selfassessed health at lower points of the distribution also emerge
in 2016. Most of these gains appear to come from the nonMedicaid-expansion components of the law.

Data and Methods
Data
We use data from the BRFSS, an annual telephone survey
organized by state health departments and the US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention. The survey collects information on various aspects of health care access and health
for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Having a large
sample size is important for our study because the ACA
affected health insurance coverage for only a fraction of the
population, limiting plausible effect sizes. The BRFSS is the
largest continuous health survey in the United States, collecting information on more than 300 000 adults per year.
We conduct our analysis using information from individuals 19 to 64 years old who were interviewed between 2011
and 2016. Individuals older than 64 years were excluded
because the ACA was not intended to affect their health care
coverage. Our sample starts in 2011 because this is the first
year in which the BRFSS included cell phones in its sampling frame. A 2011-2016 sample period gives us 3 years of
pretreatment data and 3 years of posttreatment data.
We utilize 9 outcome variables. The first 3 relate to access
to care: indicators for any health insurance coverage, having
a primary care doctor, and having any care needed but foregone because of cost in the past 12 months. The remaining
outcomes relate to self-assessed health status. These include
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dummy variables for whether overall health is good or better
(ie good, very good, or excellent), very good or excellent,
and excellent, as well as days of the last 30 not in good mental health, not in good physical health, and with health-related
functional limitations. Subjective self-assessed health variables such as these have been shown to be correlated with
objective measures of health, including mortality.31-33
The regressions include controls for demographic characteristics, household characteristics, economic characteristics,
and measures that capture state differences in the implementation of the ACA. More specifically, we use BRFSS information to construct dummy variables for age groups (5-year
increments from 25-29 to 60-64, with 19-24 as the reference
group), gender (female), race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic black,
Hispanic, and other, with non-Hispanic white as the reference
group), marital status (married), education (high school
degree, some college, and college graduate, with less than a
high school degree as the reference group), household income
($10 000-$15 000, $15 000-$20 000, $20 000-$25 000, $25
000-$35 000, $35 000-$50 000, $50 000-$75 000, and >$75
000, with <$10 000 as the reference group), number of children in the household (separate indicators for 0 to 4, with 5 or
more as the reference group), whether the respondent reports a
primary occupation of student, and whether the respondent is
unemployed. In addition, we use information from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics to control for seasonally adjusted monthly
state unemployment rate. Finally, we include dummy variables for whether states set up their own insurance exchanges
and whether these exchanges experienced glitches.34,35
One of our treatment variables, which measures the “dose”
of the ACA’s impact, is the uninsured rate in the respondent’s
“local area” in the pretreatment year of 2013. We compute
each respondent’s “local area” pretreatment uninsured rate
within our BRFSS sample. The BRFSS provides information
regarding whether the respondent resides in the center city of
a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), outside the center city
of a MSA but inside the county containing the center city,
inside a suburban county of the MSA, or not in a MSA. The
survey did not collect location information from cell phone
respondents. We use this “local area” variable to construct 4
subgroups within each state: those living within a central city,
suburbs, non-MSA, and location within the state unavailable
(this is the case for respondents interviewed on cell phones).
Based on these 4 within-state categories, we calculate the pretreatment average uninsured rates by location (considering
“cell phone” to be a location for the sake of convenience)
within a state.18 To ensure that each area contains enough
respondents to reliably compute pretreatment uninsured rates,
we combine the 7 areas with fewer than 200 respondents in
2013 with other larger areas. Specifically, we combine the
central city and suburban parts of Wyoming into one area, and
do the same for the states Vermont, South Dakota, and
Montana. In addition, we combine the suburban and rural
parts of Massachusetts, Arizona, and California. Ultimately,
we have 194 areas with 2013 uninsured rates that are

computed from 219 to 5804 respondents, with the average
being 1475 respondents and the median being 1205.
Our Medicaid expansion variable is based on information
collected by the Kaiser Family Foundation.34 A total of 32
states expanded Medicaid by 2016. The majority of states
expanded Medicaid in January 2014, with some exceptions.
Michigan’s expansion took effect in April 2014 and New
Hampshire’s in August 2014. Pennsylvania, Indiana, and
Alaska expanded Medicaid in January, February, and
September of 2015, respectively. Montana and Louisiana
expanded Medicaid in January and July of 2016, respectively.
States are classified as part of the Medicaid expansion treatment group beginning the month/year of their expansion.
Table 1 provides pretreatment means and standard deviations of the dependent variables, stratified into 4 groups based
on whether the respondent’s state expanded Medicaid and
whether her local area’s pretreatment uninsured rate was above
or below the median within the sample. According to Table 1,
79% of the sample had insurance at baseline. Individuals in
Medicaid expansion states were slightly more likely to have
insurance prior to 2014 than those in nonexpansion states
(regardless of baseline uninsurance rate levels). Residents who
live in Medicaid expansion states with prereform uninsured
rates below the median (column 3) had, on average, better
health care access and self-assessed health than the rest of the
sample even before the ACA was implemented. Our econometric design will account for these baseline differences. Our
online appendix describes trends in our outcome variables over
time as well as summary statistics for the control variables.

Data Analysis
Our goal is to estimate the 2014-2016 effects of both the fully
implemented ACA (including the Medicaid expansion) and the
ACA without the Medicaid expansion for each one of the outcomes of interest. The major challenge we face is in disentangling the impacts of the nationwide components of the ACA
(eg, subsidized Marketplace coverage and the individual mandates) from underlying year-to-year fluctuations that would
have occurred even in the ACA’s absence. To address this challenge, we adopt a DDD strategy used by 3 recent articles that
estimate the ACA’s effects on health insurance coverage after 1
year and access to care, health, and ambulance response times
after 2 years.7,18,28 This approach differs from the DD linear
regression strategy that has been used to compare Medicaid
expansion to nonexpansion states before and after the ACA’s
implementation by adding a third “difference.”
This third source of variation comes from differences in
area pretreatment (2013) uninsured rates, which allows for
the inclusion of time period fixed effects while still identifying the effect of the national components of the ACA.30
Intuitively, we would expect to see larger responses to the
national components of the ACA in areas with higher 2013
uninsured rates as a greater share of their residents could
be affected. Combining this with a separate treatment from
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Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by State Medicaid Expansion Status and Pretreatment Uninsured Rate.

Full sample
Any insurance coverage
Primary care doctor
Cost barrier to care in past year
Overall health good or better
Overall health very good or better
Overall health excellent
Days not in good physical health in
past month
Days not in good mental health in
past month
Days with health-related limitations
in past month

Medicaid expansion; Medicaid expansion;
⩾ median baseline
< median baseline
uninsured
uninsured

0.788
(0.409)
0.741
(0.439)
0.192
(0.394)
0.840
(0.367)
0.536
(0.499)
0.204
(0.403)
3.648
(7.964)
4.108
(8.210)
2.508
(6.779)

0.772
(0.419)
0.722
(0.448)
0.218
(0.412)
0.815
(0.388)
0.513
(0.499)
0.189
(0.392)
4.282
(8.660)
4.663
(8.745)
2.963
(7.367)

0.886
(0.318)
0.850
(0.357)
0.130
(0.336)
0.854
(0.353)
0.571
(0.494)
0.213
(0.409)
3.727
(8.114)
3.805
(7.955)
2.524
(6.854)

Nonexpansion; ⩾
median baseline
uninsured

Nonexpansion; <
median baseline
uninsured

0.684
(0.464)
0.634
(0.482)
0.256
(0.436)
0.826
(0.379)
0.505
(0.499)
0.200
(0.400)
4.247
(8.432)
3.630
(7.992)
2.572
(6.463)

0.831
(0.375)
0.811
(0.392)
0.171
(0.376)
0.843
(0.363)
0.545
(0.498)
0.199
(0.399)
3.789
(8.231)
3.882
(8.130)
2.572
(6.999)

Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.

the Medicaid expansion implies that the intensity of treatment (size of the coverage expansion) was strongest in
high pre-ACA uninsured rate areas in states that expanded
Medicaid.
Formally, the DDD linear regression model, which combines 2014, 2015, and 2016 into a single postreform period,
is given by Equation 1:
yiast = γ 0 + γ1 (UNINSUREDas × POSTt ) +
γ 2 ( MEDICAIDst × POSTt ) +

γ 3 (UNINSUREDas × MEDICAIDs × POSTt ) +

(1)

γ 4 X iast + θat + α as + εiast ,
where
••
••
••
••
••
••

yiast is the outcome for individual i in area type (central city, rest of MSA, non-MSA, cell phone) a in state
s in month/year t,
POSTt indicates whether period t is in the postreform
period of January 2014 or later,
X iast is a vector of control variables,
MEDICAIDs indicates whether state s participated in
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion,
UNINSUREDas is the 2013 (pre-reform) uninsured
rate in area type a within state s,
θat denotes fixed effects for each time-by-area-type
combination (eg, non-MSA in March 2012); these
control for time as flexibly as possible and also allow
time trends to evolve differentially across individuals
living in the 4 different area types,

•• α as denotes fixed effects for each area (eg, central
city in Georgia),
•• and εiast is the error term, which is heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state.
Note that POSTt is not separately included in Equation 1
since it is absorbed by the time fixed effects ( θat ), while the
terms
UNINSUREDas ,
MEDICAIDs ,
and
UNINSUREDas × MEDICAIDs are not separately included
since they are absorbed by the area fixed effects (α as ) .
Finally, BRFSS sampling weights are used to account for the
complex survey design.
The effect of the ACA without the Medicaid expansion is
given by γ1 × UNINSUREDas , which means it is assumed to
be 0 in a (hypothetical) area with a 0 percent uninsured rate at
baseline and to increase linearly as the prereform uninsured rate
rises. The effect of the Medicaid expansion alone is given by
γ 3 × UNINSUREDas × MEDICAIDs , meaning it is 0 in nonexpansion
states
(where
MEDICAIDs = 0 )
and
γ 3 ×UNINSUREDas
in
expansion
states
(where
MEDICAIDs = 1 ). As the Medicaid expansion should not causally affect coverage in an area with a 0 percent baseline uninsured rate, we consider γ 2 to represent unobserved confounders
rather than capturing part of the expansion’s causal effect.7,30 The
effect of the “full” ACA, ie, in Medicaid expansion states, combines the impacts of the Medicaid and non-Medicaid components: γ1 × UNINSUREDas + γ 3 × UNINSUREDas . In the
tables, we report the predicted effect of the ACA at the sample
mean pretreatment uninsured rate. This is given by γ1 ×
UNINSUREDas
in nonexpansion states and γ1 ×
UNINSUREDas + γ 3 × UNINSUREDas in expansion states.
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In addition to average effects over the 2014-2016 time
period, we are also interested in how the effects varied over
time across these 3 years. To analyze changes over time, we
estimate event-study models where we replace the before vs
after 2014 time indicator in our DDD model with a set of
individual year dummies. These models help to highlight the
contribution associated with the inclusion of calendar year
2016 data. The event-study DDD model we estimate is formally given by Equation 2.
T

yiast = ϕ +

∑θ (UNINSURED
t

as

× Yt ) +

Effects on Access to Care

t =1

T

∑

αt ( MEDICAIDs × Yt ) +

t =1
T

∑β (UNINSURED
t

as

results from the DDD analysis that pools the 3-year postreform period together, while the bottom panel presents results
from the event-study specification where each postreform
year is included separately. Indicators of statistical significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level are also shown. In each
case, we report 3 sets of implied effects: the ACA without the
Medicaid expansion, the Medicaid expansion alone, and the
“full” ACA which includes the Medicaid expansion (and is
thus the sum of the first 2 implied effects).

(2)

× MEDICAIDs × Yt ) +

t =1

δX iast + α as + εiast ,
where Yt is an indicator for whether year t is 2011, 2012, 2014,
2015, or 2016, respectively, for t = 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, and the other
terms are as described in Equation 1. Here the effects of the
ACA without the Medicaid expansion during 2014, 2015, and
2016 are given by θ3 × UNINSUREDas , θ4 × UNINSUREDas ,
and θ5 ×UNINSUREDas , respectively, while the effects of the
Medicaid expansion in 2014, 2015, and 2016 are similarly
given by β3 × UNINSUREDas , β4 × UNINSUREDas , and
β5 ×UNINSUREDas .
Another advantage of the event-study model is that it
allows us to test the identifying assumptions from our main
DDD specification.7,18 The first assumption is that, in the
absence of the ACA, any changes in the outcomes that would
have occurred in 2014-2016 would not have been systematically correlated with area uninsured rates, conditional on the
controls. The second assumption is that, without the ACA,
differential changes in the outcomes in 2014-2016 between
Medicaid expansion and nonexpansion states would not have
been correlated with prereform uninsured rates. While such
counterfactuals cannot be directly observed, they can be predicted based on pretreatment trends. If the event-study model
finds evidence that changes in the outcomes from 2011-2013
are correlated with area uninsured rate (ie, θ1 or θ2 are significant), this would suggest that the first assumption is
likely violated. Similarly, evidence that changes in the outcomes from 2011-2013 are correlated with the interaction of
area uninsured rate with Medicaid expansion status (ie, β1 or
β2 are significant) would suggest a violation of the second
assumption.

Results
Tables 2 and 3 report the implied effects of the ACA at the
average pretreatment uninsured rate (equal to 20.6%) based
on coefficient estimates from the regressions described by
Equations 1 and 2 for each outcome. The top panel shows the

Table 2 focuses on the outcomes related to access. The top
panel shows that the ACA led to statistically significant
increases in access to care at the sample mean pretreatment
uninsured rate in both Medicaid expansion and nonexpansion states in the postreform period. States that participated
in the Medicaid expansion (and therefore received the
national components of the ACA as well as the Medicaid
expansion) saw a 9.5 percentage point increase in insurance
coverage, a 3.4 percentage point increase in reporting having
a primary care doctor, and a 5.6 percentage point reduction in
the probability of reporting cost being a barrier to receiving
care. Results were somewhat smaller in states that refused
the Medicaid expansion (6.2 percentage point increase in
insurance coverage, 3.1 percentage point increase in reporting having a primary care doctor, and 3.6 percentage point
reduction in reporting cost being a barrier to receiving care).
The difference between these 2 sets of estimates (a 3.3 percentage point increase in insurance coverage, no statistically
significant change in reporting having a primary care doctor,
and a 1.5 percentage point reduction in the probability of
reporting cost being a barrier to receiving care) is also
reported in Table 2 and is due to the Medicaid expansion
alone. These results are generally larger than those found by
a recent article using BRFSS data and the same identification
strategy but only 2 posttreatment years, suggesting larger
effects in 2016 than in 2014 and 2015.18
To investigate how the effects changed over time more
directly, we next discuss the implied effects from the eventstudy specification. The results show that the gains in access
to care, for the majority of measures, increased over time
both in Medicaid expansion and nonexpansion states. The
first 3 rows of the bottom panel of Table 2 show the results
for nonexpansion states. The ACA led to an increase in the
probability of having insurance coverage of 3.6 percentage
points in 2014, 5.9 percentage points in 2015, and 8.3 percentage points in 2016 at the sample mean pretreatment
uninsured rate. While we also see statistically significant
increases in reports of having a primary care doctor in all 3
posttreatment years, the growth of the impact over time (2.0
percentage points in 2014 to 2.7 percentage points in 2016)
is more modest than that for insurance coverage and is statistically insignificant. We observe a growing reduction over
time in the probability of reporting cost being a barrier to
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Table 2. Implied Effects of ACA at Mean Pretreatment Uninsured Rate on Health Care Access.
Insurance
coverage
Difference-in-difference-in-differences model
ACA without Medicaid expansion 2014-2016
Medicaid expansion 2014-2016
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion) 2014-2016
Event-study model
ACA without Medicaid expansion in 2014
ACA without Medicaid expansion in 2015
ACA without Medicaid expansion in 2016
Medicaid expansion in 2014
Medicaid expansion in 2015
Medicaid expansion in 2016
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion) in 2014
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion) in 2015
Full ACA (with Medicaid expansion) in 2016
P value from F test that all pretreatment coefficients = 0
Sample size

Primary care
doctor

Cost barrier

0.062***
(0.006)
0.033***
(0.009)
0.095***
(0.012)

0.031***
(0.007)
0.002
(0.011)
0.034***
(0.009)

−0.033***
(0.006)
−0.015*
(0.007)
−0.048***
(0.008)

0.036***
(0.010)
0.059***
(0.014)
0.083***
(0.009)††
0.028*
(0.013)
0.038*
(0.017)
0.035**
(0.013)
0.065***
(0.012)
0.097***
(0.013)
0.118***
(0.015)†††
.915
1,575,395

0.020**
(0.009)
0.023
(0.024)
0.027***
(0.009)
0.008
(0.015)
0.024
(0.024)
0.023
(0.012)
0.028**
(0.014)
0.047**
(0.014)
0.050***
(0.011)
.365
1,574,392

−0.027**
(0.012)
−0.020**
(0.010)
−0.041**
(0.015)†
−0.004
(0.011)
−0.031**
(0.009)
−0.019†
(0.013)
−0.030***
(0.007)
−0.051***
(0.011)
−0.060***
(0.012)††
.787
1,575,648

Note. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. ACA = Affordable Care Act. *** indicates statistically
significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System sampling weights are used. All regressions include state ×
location type and year × location type fixed effects as well as the controls. In addition, we denote statistically significantly different effect in 2016 relative
to 2014 by ††† at 1% level; †† at 5% level; † at 10% level.

receiving care, as the 2.7 percentage point reduction in 2014
rises to 4.1 percentage points in 2016.
The last 3 rows of Table 2 report the event-study results
for states that participated in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
While the increases in access are larger than the corresponding increases in nonexpansion states, we again observe the
same general patterns of the gains strengthening over time.
The effect on the probability of having coverage rises every
year, from 6.5 percentage points in 2014 to 9.7 percentage
points in 2015 and 11.8 percentage points in 2016 at the average pretreatment uninsured rate. Based on the sample means
for the outcomes reported in Table 1, these results imply that
the full ACA—including the Medicaid expansion—reduced
the uninsured rate by 8.2% in 2014, by 12.3% in 2015, and
by 14.9% in 2016. Next, while we see statistically significant
increases in reports of having a primary care doctor in each
year in expansion states, the change between 2014 and 2016,
while sizable, is not statistically significant. The reduction in
cost being a barrier to receiving care strengthens over time,
from 3.0 percentage points in 2014 to 5.1 percentage points

in 2015 and 6.0 percentage points in 2016. The difference
between these 2 sets of results, representing the effect of the
Medicaid expansion alone, is reported in the middle 3 rows
of the bottom panel of Table 2.

Effects on Self-Assessed Health
Table 3 focuses on the outcomes related to self-assessed
health. We find evidence of gains in some aspects of selfassessed health, which contrasts a recent article’s null results
using BRFSS data and the same econometric strategy but
only 2 years of posttreatment data.18 The top panel shows
that, in the combined 3-year posttreatment period, residents
of Medicaid expansion states (receiving both the national
components of the ACA and the Medicaid expansion) saw a
statistically significant 1.3 percentage point increase in the
probability of reporting excellent health at the average pretreatment uninsured rate and a reduction in days not in good
mental health of 0.2 per month. In nonexpansion states
(receiving only the national components of the ACA), we
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Table 3. Implied Effects of ACA at Mean Pretreatment Uninsured Rate on Self-Assessed Health.
Good or
Very good or
better health excellent health
Difference-in-difference-in-differences model
ACA without Medicaid
−0.003
expansion 2014-2016
(0.005)
Medicaid expansion 20140.001
2016
(0.006)
Full ACA (with Medicaid
−0.003
expansion) 2014-2016
(0.005)
Event-study model
ACA without Medicaid
−0.004
expansion in 2014
(0.008)
ACA without Medicaid
0.001
expansion in 2015
(0.007)
ACA without Medicaid
0.015***
expansion in 2016
(0.005)††
Medicaid expansion in 2014
0.002
(0.008)
Medicaid expansion in 2015
−0.006
(0.011)
Medicaid expansion in 2016
−0.025**
(0.008)†††
Full ACA (with Medicaid
−0.003
expansion) in 2014
(0.008)
Full ACA (with Medicaid
−0.005
expansion) in 2015
(0.008)
Full ACA (with Medicaid
−0.010
expansion) in 2016
(0.008)
P value from F test that all
.367
pretreatment coefficients = 0
Sample size
1,574,915

Excellent
health

Days not in good Days not in good Days with healthphysical health
mental health
related limitations

0.012*
(0.005)
−0.009
(0.009)
0.003
(0.009)

0.016*
(0.006)
−0.002
(0.007)
0.013*
(0.006)

−0.219
(0.115)
0.151
(0.108)
−0.067
(0.116)

−0.177
(0.144)
−0.041
(0.127)
−0.218*
(0.109)

−0.195
(0.142)
0.299*
(0.142)
0.104
(0.136)

0.020***
(0.007)
0.020
(0.016)
0.043***
(0.010)†††
−0.018
(0.012)
−0.015
(0.019)
−0.032*
(0.015)
0.002
(0.011)
0.005
(0.013)
0.012
(0.015)
.152

0.014
(0.009)
0.009
(0.009)
0.035***
(0.007)
−0.006
(0.011)
0.009
(0.011)
−0.008
(0.010)
0.008
(0.011)
0.019**
(0.009)
0.027**
(0.011)†
.039

−0.100
(0.247)
0.116
(0.189)
−0.412
(0.286)††
0.146
(0.258)
−0.056
(0.214)
0.499
(0.308)†
0.046
(0.165)
0.061
(0.166)
0.087
(0.177)
.256

−0.131
(0.170)
0.269
(0.142)
−0.216
(0.177)
−0.160
(0.153)
−0.132
(0.211)
0.047
(0.181)
−0.292**
(0.133)
0.137
(0.150)
−0.169
(0.0158)
.334

−0.044
(0.133)
0.123
(0.157)
−0.207**
(0.094)
0.117
(0.200)
0.132
(0.175)
0.423*
(0.161)†
0.073
(0.192)
0.255
(0.170)
0.216
(0.150)
.293

1,560,340

1,561,612

1,568,250

1,574,915

1,574,915

Note. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. ACA = Affordable Care Act. *** indicates statistically
significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System sampling weights are used. All regressions include state ×
location type and year × location type fixed effects as well as the controls. In addition, we denote statistically significantly different effect in 2016 relative
to 2014 by ††† at 1% level; †† at 5% level; † at 10% level.

find 2 statistically significant results—a 1.6 percentage point
increase in reporting excellent health and a 1.2 percentage
point increase in reporting very good or excellent health—as
well as an impact on mental health that is almost as large as
that for expansion states, though not significant. We also find
that the Medicaid expansion alone led to an increase in days
with health-related limitations. Together, these results suggest that gains in self-assessed health from the ACA are
mostly or entirely attributable to the expansion of private
insurance among low-to-middle-income individuals rather
than the Medicaid expansion among those with low incomes.
Appendix Figure 2 provides suggestive evidence that the
gains in self-assessed health in nonexpansion states are the
result of both increases among those in states with prereform
uninsured rates above the median and reductions in states
with prereform uninsured rates below the median. Also discussed further in the appendix is an alternative specification
to evaluate our finding that the Medicaid expansion is not a
driver of the increase in self-assessed health: a DD analysis

of the effect of the Medicaid expansion among a sample of
low-income individuals (<$25 000 per year). Consistent
with our DDD results, the DD results show that the Medicaid
expansion led to improvements in access to care but not selfassessed health.
The bottom panel of Table 3 presents the event-study
results for the self-assessed health outcomes, which clearly
illustrate the importance of the third posttreatment year. In
nonexpansion states, we see large and statistically significant
gains in 2016 in reports of good or better health (1.5 percentage point increase), very good or excellent health (4.3 percentage point increase), and excellent health (3.5 percentage
point increase). These results suggest gains across the entire
distribution of self-assessed health. We also see a statistically
significant reduction in days with health-related limitations in
2016. The only result in these outcomes that was significant
in 2014 or 2015 was a 2 percentage point increase in very
good/excellent health in 2014—and the size of this effect
more than doubled in 2016. In states that fully implemented
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the ACA, we see statistically significant increases in reports
of excellent health in 2015 (1.9 percentage point increase)
and 2016 (2.7 percentage point increase). Based on the sample means for the outcomes reported in Table 1, these results
imply that the full ACA increased the probability of reporting
excellent health by 9.3% in 2015 and by 13.2% in 2016. As
with the DDD results discussed previously, the fact that the
event-study model reveals clearer gains in self-assessed
health in non-Medicaid-expansion states than in expansion
states suggests that health gains from the ACA are driven by
the private expansion rather than the Medicaid expansion.
This interpretation is also supported by our estimates of the
impact of the Medicaid expansion alone, reported in the middle 3 lines of the bottom panel of Table 3, which suggest that
the Medicaid expansion led to a 2.5 percentage point reduction in reporting good or better health and an increase in days
with health-related limitations in 2016.
Given the large number of null hypotheses tested in Tables
2 and 3, we might expect a few significant results to emerge
merely by chance. Specifically, with 9 outcomes and 12
reported results for each, there are a total of 108 hypothesis
tests, meaning that 5 to 6 spurious results would be expected
to emerge using a 5% significance level. However, we
observe 45 significant results across the 2 tables, strongly
suggesting that chance alone cannot explain our findings.

Testing Identifying Assumptions of the Model
As discussed previously, another benefit of our eventstudy analysis is that it enables tests of the model’s identifying assumptions by asking whether the coefficients
on
the
interactions
of
UNINSUREDas
and
UNINSUREDas × MEDICAIDst with the year 2011 and
2012 dummies are statistically significant relative to the
base year of 2013. We found only 1 placebo test failure out
of 36 (4 for each of the 9 outcomes) using a 5% significance level. One out of 36 is 2.8%, which is slightly below
the number of rejections that we would expect to obtain by
chance. In addition, for each regression we conducted an F
test of the null hypothesis that all of the interactions for the
2011 and 2012 year dummies are equal to 0. The results are
reported at the bottom of Tables 2 and 3 and are statistically insignificant in all but 1 of the 9 regressions. The full
event-study results are presented graphically in Figures 3
to 6 in the appendix. We also include in our appendix
results from a large number of specification checks that
strongly support our findings for the health care access
outcomes in Table 2 and usually support those for the selfassessed health outcomes in Table 3. Individual exceptions
are noted in our discussion of the appendix tables.

Discussion
Our primary contribution is to show that the ACA’s impact on
access to care continued to grow in 2016, while improvements

INQUIRY
in self-assessed health emerged that were not evident using the
same research design and data source but only 2 years of posttreatment data. Such delayed effects could be attributable to
several factors, such as the gradual nature of the coverage
expansions, increasing enrollee familiarity with their new
insurance coverage, or an extended amount of medical treatment being necessary to make progress on certain chronic
conditions.
A particularly interesting aspect of our results is that the
ACA’s effect on self-assessed health appears to operate
entirely through the nationwide portions of the law rather
than the Medicaid expansion. Medicaid’s relatively low reimbursement rates can lead to difficulty finding a primary care
provider, which could limit its effect on health relative to
Marketplace plans.36 Accordingly, we find that the ACA’s
impacts on having a primary care doctor and foregone care
due to cost are almost completely attributable to the national
portion of the law rather than the Medicaid expansion.
Working in the other direction is the fact that private insurance plans generally have higher deductibles and copayments
than Medicaid, which might limit access for Marketplace participants. However, a very large percentage of Marketplace
enrollees (72%) were potentially eligible for cost-sharing
reductions that reduce the difference in out-of-pocket costs
between Medicaid and Marketplace enrollees.37
Differences in the treated populations could provide another
explanation for our finding that the ACA’s private expansion,
rather than its Medicaid expansion, appears to account for the
health gains. The ACA specified Medicaid as the mechanism to
insure low-income individuals and Marketplaces as the mechanism to insure those closer to the middle of the income distribution. If higher socioeconomic–status individuals are more
efficient producers of health—as suggested by one article’s
finding of differences across the income distribution in the
amount of health care utilized after gaining coverage—this
could explain the relative effectiveness of the private expansion.38 Further evidence comes from a recent study showing
that the Marketplace population is more health literate than
samples from prior insurance expansions.37
With all that said, it is important to note that our finding of
minimal improvements in primary care access and selfassessed health from the Medicaid expansion contrasts the
large gains in both access and self-assessed health that were
observed after the randomized Oregon Medicaid expansion.22 On the contrary, both our results focusing on the number of days not in good mental health and those focusing on
depression in the Oregon study suggest the potential for coverage expansions to improve mental health.22,39 This mixed
concordance suggests the potential for state-to-state variation in Medicaid’s impacts.
Our findings also highlight the need for additional
research that examines how other relevant outcomes associated with the ACA changed in 2016, such as sources of coverage, health care utilization, objective health measures,
labor market outcomes, and financial well-being.40 To the
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extent to which improved program administration contributed to the increases in self-assessed health, it will be important to analyze the impact of the more recent administrative
changes involving the ACA. These include changes in the
amount of funding allocated toward outreach, the timing
associated with open enrollment, and the hours of operation
for the Marketplace website.

Conclusion
Using data from the BRFSS, this article examines the causal
impacts of the ACA on health-related outcomes after 3 years.
We estimate triple-difference models that exploit variation in
treatment intensity from local area pre-ACA uninsured rates
and state participation in the Medicaid expansion. The inclusion of a third postreform year leads to 2 important insights.
First, gains in health insurance coverage and access to care
from the ACA continued to increase in the third year. Second,
an improvement in self-assessed health emerged in the third
year, with the effect being largely driven by the non-Medicaid components of the ACA.
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